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When the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binds, monetary policy cannot provide appropriate
stimulus. We show that in the standard New Keynesian model, tax policy can deliver such stimulus
at no cost and in a time-consistent manner. There is no need to use inefficient policies such as wasteful
public spending or future commitments to inflate. We conclude that in the New Keynesian model,
the zero bound on nominal interest rates is not a relevant constraint on both fiscal and monetary policy.
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Arbitrage between money and bonds restricts nominal interest rates from becoming negative. One could
imagine circumstances in which, in the event of a potential recession, it is desirable for the Central Bank to
lower the policy rate. If the interest rate is very close to zero to begin with, the constraint may be binding.
This is the "zero bound" problem of monetary policy.
But, is there a zero bound problem when policy is more generally considered to include both ﬁscal and
monetary instruments? Is ﬁscal policy able to avoid a downturn when the zero bound constraint binds? In
this paper we show that the zero bound on nominal interest rates is not a relevant constraint on both ﬁscal
and monetary policy. If the nominal interest rate is zero, taxes can play the role that the nominal interest
rate would play, could it be used without restrictions.
Considerable attention has been placed on this issue in recent times, following the outbreak of the 2008
and 2009 ﬁnancial crisis. Nominal interest rates have indeed been very close to zero in the US, the EMU,
the UK and other countries. Given the restrictions on monetary policy, attention has shifted to alternative
policies. There has been work on public spending multipliers, showing that these can be very large at the
zero bound (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, Rebelo (2009), Eggertsson (2009), Woodford (2010), Mertens and
Ravn (2010)1). Eggertsson (2009) also considers diﬀerent alternative taxes and assesses which one is the
most desirable to deal with the zero bound. The zero bound is also a key component in the numerical
work presented in the evaluation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan by Romer and Bernstein
(2009). It is also a main concern in Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2010) who argue for a better
integration between monetary and ﬁscal policy.
There is also earlier work on the implications of the zero bound for monetary and ﬁscal policy, motivated
by the prolonged recession in Japan where overnight rates have been every close to zero for the last ﬁfteen
years, as well as by the low targets for the Fed funds rate in the US in 2003 and 2004.2 Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003 and 2004a) show that there may be downturns that could, and should, be avoided if it was
not for the zero bound. They also show how monetary policy can be adjusted so that the costs of those
downturns may be reduced. In particular they propose policies that keep the interest rate for a longer period
at zero in order to generate inﬂation. Eggertsson and Woodford (2004b) consider both monetary and ﬁscal
policy in a Ramsey taxation model, with consumption taxes only. They show that, if prices would be set
before a sales-type tax but after a VAT-type tax, then it would be possible to implement the same second
best equilibrium as if the zero bound was not binding. They ﬁnd these taxes to be highly unrealistic and
move on to analyze the case of a single consumption tax. All this work is done in the context of standard
sticky price models, where the zero bound on interest rates can be a serious challenge to policy. That is
indeed the general conclusion, justifying the use of ineﬃcient policies, such as wasteful government spending,
leading to undesirable inﬂation.
1Mertens and Ravn show that multipliers can be low if the economy is close to an alternative, liquidity trap, steady state.
2In 2003 and 2004, the Fed funds rate fell down to 1%, and remained there for more than year.
1With a diﬀerent, more general focus, Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008) show that ﬁscal policy can be
used to neutralize the eﬀects of price stickiness. They consider an optimal Ramsey taxation model without
capital but with a monetary distortion, similar to the one in Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe (1991), but with sticky prices. They show that under sticky prices it is possible to implement
the same allocations as under ﬂexible prices, and that it is optimal to do so. Since the zero bound is the
optimal policy under ﬂexible prices, it must also be the optimal one under sticky prices. In this sense, the
zero bound is not a constraint to policy. These results and the pressing relevance of the policy question were
the motivation for this work.
In this paper, we take the standard set up analyzed by most of the zero bound literature, allow for
capital accumulation, and consider labor income, consumption, and capital income taxes. We show that
whatever policy can do with the nominal interest rate c a nb ed o n ew i t hac o m b i n a t i o no ft h o s et h r e et a x e s .
Furthermore, there is no equivalent restriction to the zero bound on nominal interest rates, when policy uses
taxes rather than interest rates. We conclude that, when ﬁscal policy is used, the zero bound on nominal
interest rates does not restrict the set of implementable allocations. In the simple New Keynesian model, as
in Eggertsson (2009), it is possible to achieve the ﬁrst best allocation if the zero bound does not bind, or,
alternatively, if taxes are used. This is an extreme result. In more general set ups, full eﬃciency cannot be
attained. It is still the case, though, that the zero bound is irrelevant for both ﬁscal and monetary policy.
We show this by considering an extension of the model where productivity shocks are ﬁrm speciﬁco rt h e
initial distribution of prices across ﬁrms is non-degenerate.3
Suppose real rates ought to be negative. Since the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, the only
way to achieve negative real interest rates is to generate inﬂation. This is precisely what the commitment
to low future interest rates ﬁrst suggested in Krugman (1998) achieves in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003
and 2004a). But producer price inﬂation is costly. Indeed, in the New Keynesian, sticky price, literature,
price setting decisions are staggered. Producer price inﬂation then necessarily leads to dispersion in relative
prices–a real economic distortion. Is it possible to achieve negative real interest rates without incurring
this economic cost? We show that the answer to this question is aﬃrmative if ﬂexible tax instruments are
available.
The intuition why tax policy can neutralize the eﬀects of the zero bound constraint is simple. It turns out
that the prices that matter for intertemporal decisions are consumer prices, which are gross of consumption
taxes. The idea is to induce inﬂation in consumer prices, while keeping producer price inﬂation at zero. The
result is negative real interest rates, and the distortions associated with producer price inﬂation are altogether
avoided. This can be achieved by simultaneously adjusting consumption and labor taxes. Imagine ﬁrst that
producer price inﬂation is zero. Then a temporarily lower consumption tax generates inﬂation in consumer
prices. The problem is that this changes in consumption taxes introduces undesirable variations in the
marginal cost of ﬁrms over time: a lower consumption tax reduces the marginal cost of ﬁrms. It also creates
3Yun (2005) analyzes optimal monetary policy when the initial distribution of prices is non-degenerate.
2incentives for producers to reduce their prices. This eﬀect must therefore be counteracted by temporarily
raising the labor tax. Overall, this policy acts as a costless tax on money.4 It essentially achieves a negative
nominal interest rate in the consumer price numeraire.
In a model with capital, this policy must be supplemented with a temporary capital subsidy. This is
because a path of consumption taxes which increases over time acts as a tax on capital. This tax on capital
is undesirable and must be counteracted with a corresponding subsidy. The goal is to tax money, not capital.
Importantly, because our policy implements the eﬃcient allocation, it is time-consistent: if a future
planner were given an opportunity to revise this policy in the future, it would choose not to do so. This
should be contrasted with the policy recommendations involving future commitments to low interest rates
in Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003 and 2004a).
The policy we examine requires ﬂexibility of taxes. It has been argued that ﬁscal instruments are not
as ﬂexible as monetary policy instruments. Whether this argument applies to stabilization policy during
a "great moderation" period could be argued about. However, it certainly does not apply to exceptional
circumstances such as the recent crisis or the Japanese stagnation in the nineties, precisely because the need
to use ﬁscal instruments is exceptional. There have been recent policy proposals in this direction by Robert
Hall and Susan Woodward5, and earlier on, by Feldstein (2003), intended at Japan.6 Both of them suggested
lowering consumption taxes as a way to ﬁght the crisis. Our model formalizes these proposals and highlights
the way other taxes must be jointly used.
The paper proceeds as follows: We ﬁrst describe the model, in section 2. In section 3, we characterize the
ﬁrst best allocation and show how it can be implemented, away from the zero bound using interest rate policy,
and at the zero bound using tax policy. We consider the linearized model in section 4, so that the relation
with the literature can be made more clear. We consider a model with capital in section 5. In section 6, we
show that the results can be generalized to environments where it is not optimal (or feasible) to replicate
ﬂexible prices. In a model with ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity shocks and/or a non-degenerate distribution of
initial prices, it is still the case that the zero bound constraint on nominal interest rates can be overcome
using tax policy.
4In conformity with the New Keynesian literature, we consider cashless economies. We therefore ignore the costs of inﬂation
associated with the inﬂation tax resulting from deviations from the Friedman rule.
5An article by Justin Lahart in the Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2009, "State Sales-Tax Cuts: Get Another Look",
comments on the proposals of Hall and Woodward in their blog. See also the speech by Narayana Kocherlakota, President of
the Minneapolis Fed, "Monetary Policy Actions and Fiscal Policy Substitutes," November 18, 2010.
6"The Japanese government could announce that it will raise the current 5 percent value added tax by 1 percent per quarter
and simultaneously reduce the income tax rates to keep revenue unchanged, continuing this for several years until the VAT
reaches 20 percent." Feldstein (2003).
32 The Model
The model we analyze is a standard new-Keynesian model, similar to the one analyzed by Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) and (2004b), and Eggertsson (2009). As it has become standard in the New Keynesian
literature, the economy is cashless.
The uncertainty in period  ≥ 0 is described by the random variable  ∈ ,w h e r e is the set of
possible events at , and the history of its realizations up to period  is denoted by  ∈ . For simplicity
we index by  the variables that are functions of .

















where  is private consumption of variety  ∈ [01],  is total labor, and  is a preference shock.
Aggregate government consumption  is exogenous. It is also a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of public











The production function of each good , uses labor,  according to
 +  =  (4)






The government minimizes the expenditure on the individual goods, for a given aggregate, and ﬁnances it with
time varying taxes on consumption, 
, and labor income, 
 . As is standard in the new-Keynesian literature,




































 + +1+1 = 

−1 + 





Π − (1 + 
) − 
together with a no-Ponzi games condition. +1 represent the quantity of state contingent bonds that
pay one unit of money at time +1 in state +1 and 

 are risk free nominal bonds. +1 is the price of
the state contingent bond, normalized by the probability of occurrence of the state at  +1 ,a n d 1
1+ is the
price of the riskless bond–so 1+ is the gross nominal interest rate.  is the nominal wage and Π are
proﬁt s .W ea s s u m et h a tp r o ﬁts are fully taxed,  =1 .7
The ﬁrst order conditions of the household problem that maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget

























 (1 + 
)











Each variety is produced by a monopolist. Prices are set as in Calvo (1983). Every period, a ﬁrm is able to
revise the price with probability 1 − . The lottery that assigns rights to change prices is  over time
and across ﬁrms. Since there is a continuum of ﬁrms, 1 −  is also the share of ﬁrms that are able to revise




+ [+ − ++]
where + is the nominal price at  of one unit of money at a particular state in period  + , output







7This assumption is irrelevant for the results.
5obtained from (8) and (7), where + = + + +.





































Using the demand functions (8), (7), it follows that










An equilibrium for { }, {  },a n d{





























































In addition, an equilibrium condition is that the zero bound on nominal interest rates be veriﬁed so that
 ≥ 0
Here  is the share of ﬁrms that have set prices  periods before,  =( )(1 − ),  =0 2,a n d
+1 =( )+1, which is the share of ﬁrms that have never set prices so far. We assume that they all charge
an exogenous price −1.8
For now we abstract from the particular way in which monetary policy is conducted, whether it follows
a standard feedback rule, a target rule or a simple target for the sequence of nominal interest rates. In what
follows we characterize the eﬃcient allocation and the policy variables and prices that are consistent with it.
In Section 4, we explicitly consider an interest rate rule as well as ﬁscal policy rules and discuss uniqueness
of equilibria.
8We do not need to keep track of the budget constraints, since lump sum taxes adjust to satisfy the budget.
63E ﬃcient allocations
The ﬁrst best allocation is the one that maximizes utility (1) subject to the technology constraints (2), (3),
(4) and (5), above.
From (4) and (5), it follows that the marginal rate of transformation between any two varieties is equal






,i tm u s tb et h a ta ne ﬃcient allocation satisﬁes
 = ,a l l, .
A similar argument applies to public consumption of the diﬀerent varieties, so that
 = ,a l l, .









 +  =  (20)
By comparing the eﬃciency conditions with the equilibrium conditions we can describe the prices and
policy variables that are consistent with the eﬃcient allocation.
We now show that there are policies and prices that support the eﬃcient allocation, both away from and
at the zero bound. At the zero bound, those policies involve state and time varying taxes. We do this by
showing that there are policies and prices satisfying all the equilibrium conditions, above, for the eﬃcient
allocation, taking into account the zero bound constraint on the nominal interest rate.
3.1 Policy away from the zero bound.
In this section, we review how monetary policy can implement the eﬃcient allocation with constant taxes
on consumption  and labor .
First, in order to achieve production eﬃciency, conditions (8) and (7) imply that prices must be the same
across ﬁrms
−
 =1 . That can only be the case if ﬁrms start at time zero with a common price, −1,9 as we
assume, and if ﬁrms that can subsequently change prices choose that common price, so that  =  = −1.
This means that the price level must be constant across time and states. The reason is simple. Because
price setting decisions are staggered, inﬂation necessarily comes at the cost of dispersion in relative prices.
This represents an economic distortion. Avoiding this distortion requires that inﬂation be zero.
It therefore follows that the aggregate resource constraint (18) becomes (20). From Calvo’s price setting











9This is the standard assumption. Yun (2005) analyzes the case with initial price dispersion.
7This implies that






as under ﬂexible prices. Thus, the nominal wage must move with productivity so as to maintain the nominal
marginal cost constant.
From (15), with constant consumption taxes, we have






so the nominal interest rate must equal the natural real interest rate–the real interest rate that prevails at
the eﬃcient allocation.









implying that 1 −  =( 1+) 
−1.
One possibility is to set consumption taxes to zero,  =0 . Therefore labor must be subsidized at the
rate 1 −  = 
−1. This labor subsidy is necessary to neutralize the mark up distortion. Note that the
subsidy is constant over time and states.







zero bound constraint is not binding and the eﬃcient allocation is implemented with constant taxes and
ﬂexible monetary rate policy. In this model, in normal times, monetary policy achieves perfect economic
stabilization. We now look at the more interesting case where the natural rate of interest is negative.
3.2 Policy at the zero bound
We have seen that, in order to implement the eﬃcient allocation with constant taxes, the nominal interest
rate must equal the natural rate of interest, and prices must be constant. This implementation breaks down
when the natural rate of interest turns negative, because of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest
rate. With constant taxes, this failure is unavoidable and optimal monetary policy can only achieve a second
best allocation. We start by reviewing the policy trade-oﬀs confronting the design of monetary policy when
the zero lower bound is binding. We then move on to explain how ﬂexible taxes can be used to completely
circumvent the zero lower bound and implement the eﬃcient allocation.
One strategy is to then set the nominal interest rate to zero as long as the natural rate of interest is
negative, and to start raising the nominal interest rate again when the natural rate of interest turns positive.
This strategy results in deﬂation and hence positive real interest rates when the zero bound is binding,
precisely when the natural rate of interest is negative. This deﬂation comes together with a contraction in
output compared to the eﬃcient allocation.
With constant taxes, the only way to achieve a negative real interest rate is to generate inﬂation. Because
price setting decisions are staggered, this necessarily generates dispersion in relative prices. This represents
8a real distortion and implies that the eﬃcient allocation cannot be implemented. These distortions have to
be weighted against the stimulation beneﬁts of lower real interest rates in the form of higher output and
consumption.
Recognizing this trade-oﬀ leads to another strategy whose premise is to supplement zero nominal interest
rates with a commitment to keeping nominal interest rates below the natural rate of interest even when the
natural rate turns back positive. This commitment to stimulate the economy in the future raises demand
today through a wealth eﬀect. Both higher present and future demand induces ﬁrms to raise their prices. This
in turn generates inﬂation, which lowers the real interest rate today and further stimulates the economy. In
fact, following Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003 and 2004a) show that the optimal monetary
policy (with constant taxes) precisely follows this strategy. It is important to emphasize that this strategy
does not implement the eﬃcient allocation.
Instead if taxes are used, the eﬃcient allocation can be implemented at the zero bound. To see this,
we set the nominal interest rate to the natural rate of interest whenever the latter is positive, and to zero
















can be satisﬁed with the appropriate choice of consumption taxes over time, even if prices are constant.





















and the ﬁrst best is achieved. As long as consumption and labor income taxes are ﬂexible instruments, the
zero bound is not a constraint to policy.
The tax policy that implements the eﬃcient allocation does not involve net taxing or subsidizing. Notice
that the present value budget constraint of the households, can be written, replacing prices and taxes from


















0 (1 + 
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0 is unrestricted by the implementation of the eﬃcient allocation whether at the zero bound,
or away from it. It is a lump sum tax on the initial nominal wealth of households. The present value of
9lump sum taxes is equal to the present value of government spending plus the value of initial liabilities. The
present value of the other taxes, used to implement the eﬃcient allocation, is zero. This is the case whether
the allocation is implemented with interest rates away from the zero bound, or with consumption and labor
income taxes. In this sense, tax policy that implements the eﬃcient allocation at the zero bound is revenue
neutral.
We now consider a special case of the model–the same considered by Eggertsson (2009) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009)–and describe optimal tax policy following a shock that lowers the natural
rate of interest to the point where the zero bound constraint would be binding. The discussion on alternative
policies in this context has focused on the role of government purchases.10 This is not without a, possibly
major, resource loss. Instead, the policy we characterize below deals with the zero bound constraint on
monetary policy at no cost.
3.3 Using ﬁscal policy to avoid a recession
As in Eggertsson (2009) and Christiano et al. (2009) we consider speciﬁc preferences as
( )=( ) (23)
In this way, the preference shock does not aﬀect the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure. It will, however, aﬀect the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time  and
consumption at time  +1 .W ea l s oa s s u m et h a t = ,  =1 , so that the only shock is the preference
shock.







 +  = 
Therefore the eﬃcient allocation is constant, and is unaﬀected by the preference shock.
Let us consider a particular example, a deterministic version of the examples in Eggertsson (2009) and
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009). In their models, it is this shock - interacting with the zero
bound - that generates a potentially big recession.
Assume that  evolves exogenously according to

+1
 for  =0 12 − 1

+1
=1for  =  +1 +2 
10Eggertsson also considers tax changes, but only one at a time. As we show, it is key to be able to change the two taxes -
consumption and labor income - jointly.
10The natural rate of interest is 1


+1  1 if and 1
  1 for  ≥ . We set the nominal interest rate
to 1+ =1for  ≤  − 1 and 1+ = 








 for  =0 12 − 1







=1  for all 
Note that we have one degree of freedom in the choice of tax policy: the initial level of the consumption tax

0. Given an initial consumption tax, the equations above completely determine the paths of consumption
and labor taxes. Consumption taxes increase over time for and then stabilize at some level  for
 ≥ . Labor taxes follow the opposite pattern: they decrease over time for a n dt h e ns t a b i l i z ea ts o m e




The key is that the prices that matter for intertemporal decisions are consumer prices, which are gross of
consumption taxes. The idea is to induce inﬂation in consumer prices, while keeping producer price inﬂation
at zero. The result is negative real interest rates, and the distortions associated with producer price inﬂation
are altogether avoided. This can be achieved by a simultaneous adjustment in consumption and labor taxes.
A temporarily lower consumption tax (
  ) generates inﬂation in consumer prices. Why does the
labor tax need to be temporarily raised (
  )? The changes in consumption tax introduce undesirable
variations in the marginal cost of ﬁrms: if the labor tax is kept unchanged at , the lower consumption
tax (
  ) reduces the marginal cost of ﬁrms. This also creates incentives for producers to reduce their
prices. This eﬀect must therefore be counteracted by temporarily raising the labor tax (
  ).
This policy resembles the sales tax holiday proposal by Hall and Woodward at the end of 2008 and
Feldstein in 2003 addressing the Japanese stagnation in the nineties. To implement the ﬁrst best, however,
it is important to note that labor taxes must be adjustedi nt h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o no fc o n s u m p t i o nt a x e ss o
as not to distort the intratemporal margin.
3.4 Time-consistency
Importantly, because our policy implements the eﬃcient allocation, it is time-consistent. If a future planner
were given an opportunity to revise this policy in the future, it would choose not to do so. This should be
contrasted with the policy recommendations involving future commitments to low interest rates in Krugman
(1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003 and 2004a). These policies involve commitments to "being
irresponsible" in the future by keeping the nominal interest rate below the natural rate of interest even when
the latter turns back positive. When the future comes, a planner is tempted to renege on these commitments
and raise interest rates as soon at the natural rate of interest turns positive.
This represents an additional advantage of ﬂexible tax policy. Not only does it deliver a better allocation
(the eﬃcient one), it also has the beneﬁt of not requiring costly commitments that might be diﬃcult to make
credible.
114 The linearized model
In order to relate our results more closely to the literature, we now analyze the log-linearized version of the
model. As before, we assume  =1 ,  = ,a n d( )=( ).
Then, the following equations provide a log linear approximation11 to the model above:
b  = b +1 − (ˆ  − +1 − )+(b 

+1 − b 

) (24)
 = b  +  (b 

 + b 

)++1 (25)
where  =l n 
−1, ˆ  =l n( 1+), b  =l n












(1−),a n d =l n 
−1 +l n −
 ln+1.N o t et h a t and  are in levels, while the other variables are in deviations to the steady state.
That is only for the convenience of deﬁning the lower bound. The steady state has zero inﬂation, zero growth
rate of taxes, and the nominal interest rate equal to the real, ˆ  =  =l n
−1.
We now assume that monetary policy follows an interest rate rule that explicitly takes into account the
lower bound on nominal interest rates
ˆ  =m a x {0  +  + b }. (26)
In this linear version of the model, if the parameters of t h ei n t e r e s tr a t er u l es a t i s f yt h eT a y l o rp r i n c i p l e ,
then given the tax policy, the interest rate rule implements a unique local solution to the linear system.
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r eﬁscal policy is not used, b 

 =0and b 

 =0 . As long as the lower bound does not
bind, movements in the nominal interest rate can fully oﬀset the preference shock aﬀecting . Indeed, the
interest rate rule is deﬁned so as to fully insulate output and inﬂation from this shock, so that in equilibrium,
b  =0 ,a n d =0 . The intuition is simple: shocks to the real interest rate should be absorbed one to one
by changes in the nominal interest rate. In this way, the shock does not aﬀect prices and therefore there is
no change in output.
Note, on the other hand, that if the nominal interest rate is zero and there is a large enough negative
shock to the real interest rate such that   0, this could result in deﬂation and, given the price frictions,
output would drop. This is why the zero bound on interest rates can be a cost to policy.
Fiscal policy can also be used to respond to the shock, and fully stabilize the economy. Suppose the
outcome of the interest rate rule is that the nominal interest rate is zero, ˆ  =0 . From (24), it is clear that
there will be a conditional growth rate of the consumption tax,
b 

+1 − b 

 = ,
that will satisfy the ﬁrst equation for b  = b +1 =0and +1 =0 . From (25), there is an adjustment
on the labor income tax,
b 

 = −b 

,
that will satisfy the second equation for b  =0and  = +1 =0 . The interest rate rule (26) is satisﬁed.
11See the Appendix for the derivation of the linear approximation. The linear equations are similar to Eggertsson (2009).
125 A Model with Capital
The model can easily be extended to allow for capital accumulation. However, to achieve the ﬁrst best, the
tax policy must be enriched to include a tax on income from capital. To do so, assume that investment, ,











Aggregate investment increases the capital stock according to
+1 =( 1− ) + . (28)





















−1 +  +( 1− ) −

 ( − )+( 1− 
 ) − (1 + 
) − 
 is the rental cost of capital. Note that the tax 
 has an allowance for depreciation. We believe this is the
most natural assumption. As we will show, it will have implications on the behavior of this tax rate when
implementing the optimal allocation.













,  ≥ 0 (31)
The production function of each good , , uses labor, ,a n dc a p i t a la n di sg i v e nb y
 =  ( )
where  is an aggregate productivity shock and the production function is constant returns to scale.














Let the corresponding cost function be  =  (; ).T h i si sl i n e a ri n, so that marginal cost is a
function of the aggregates only.








where  () is marginal cost, and  are the same as in the model without capital.
Market clearing for each variety implies that
 +  +  =  ( ) (32)





Using the demand functions (8), (7), it follows that12









 ( ). (34)

































































 ( ) (38)
As before, we do not need to keep track of the budget constraints, since lump sum taxes adjust to satisfy
the budget.
Eﬃcient allocations As before, at the eﬃcient allocation, the marginal rate of technical substitution
between any two varieties must be equal to one, so
 =  ;  =  ;  = 
































[+1 (+1 +1)+1− ] (40)
and
 +  + +1 − (1 − ) =  ( ) (41)
Policy variables and prices with variable interest rates We ﬁrst set 
 =0 . As before, so as to
achieve production eﬃciency, the price level must be constant across time and states. The aggregate resource





so that nominal marginal cost must be constant. Since  ( )= 
 = 

















 so the labor income tax will have to be 1 − 
 = 
−1. The nominal wage will be









and the nominal interest rate must move with the real rate to satisfy







The rental cost of capital satisﬁes (35). Finally, the tax rate on capital income must be chosen to satisfy the














+1 (+1 +1) − 
¶¸¾

Clearly the capital income tax must be moving with shocks in order to implement the eﬃcient allocation.
It is no longer the case that the eﬃcient allocation can be implemented with constant taxes.13
It is interesting to note, though, that this is the case because we assume, as is standard, that ﬁrms can
deduct depreciation expenses from the capital income tax, i.e., the tax is paid on ( − ).I f ,i n s t e a d ,























 =1 , would be consistent with the optimal allocation.
13Standard New Keynesian models usually have labor only and assume taxes are not ﬂexible. If instead they considered
capital, the nonﬂexiblity of taxes would be costly.
15Policy variables and prices at the zero bound When the natural rate of interest is negative, the
eﬃcient allocation can no longer be implemented with constant consumption and labor taxes. But it can
still be implemented with ﬂexible taxes.
As before, we set the nominal interest equal to the natural rate of interest whenever the latter is positive,















which imposes restrictions on the path of consumption taxes. There are multiple paths that satisfy these
constraints. The labor income tax will have to move to compensate for the movements in the consumption
tax, satisfying condition (42) above.






















+1 (+1 +1) − 
¶¸)

Going back to the experiment of Section 33, when the zero bound is temporarily binding, we must
now supplement consumption and labor taxes with capital taxes. The reason is simple. When capital is
introduced in the model, the increasing path of consumption taxes, that is necessary to circumvent the zero
bound constraint, acts as an undesirable tax on capital. Its eﬀects on capital accumulation must therefore
be counteracted with an oﬀsetting capital subsidy. This subsidy must remain in place as long as the natural
rate of interest is negative (until period ).
6 The irrelevance of the zero bound in more general environments
We have shown that tax policy can be used to achieve full eﬃciency, when nominal interest rates are at the
zero bound. In order for this to be the case, it must be that there are no idiosyncratic shocks, that the
initial distribution of prices across ﬁrms is degenerate, that lump sum taxes are used to ﬁnance the subsidies
to production. We ﬁnd the extreme case to be particularly illustrative of the point we want to make, but
the result is more general. In these cashless economies with sticky prices, whatever policy can do with the
nominal rate, can also be done with tax policy. But tax policy can do more: The zero bound constraint can
be made irrelevant. This is the case, regardless of whether full eﬃciency can be attained. We now make this
explicit.
We modify the model in Section 2 and allow for productivity shocks to be idiosyncratic. The production
function of each good ,n o w ,u s e sl a b o r , according to
 +  = + =  (43)
14Note that, contrary to the case with a ﬂexible interest rate and no consumption taxes, in this case a ﬂexible capital income
tax rate is necessary even if the tax base is the gross capital income.
16where  is an aggregate shock and  is an uncorrelated ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity shock.
Let  ∈ {01} be the random variable, such that, if  =1 ,t h eﬁrm can change the price. The draws
are  over time and across ﬁrms with −1 []=1 .T h eﬁrms that are able to change prices choose the
price ∗














obtained from (8) and (7), where + = + + +.



























The price of ﬁrm  is  = ∗
 if  =1 ,a n d = −1,o t h e r w i s e .
6.1 Equilibria
Using the demand functions (8), (7), it follows that














An equilibrium for { }, { ∗
  },a n d{

 } is characterized by households marginal con-
ditions (14), (15) with  ≥ 1, the price setting constraint (44), above, the condition for the price level (6),
where  = ∗
 if  =1 ,a n d = −1, otherwise, and the resource constraints (45).
If, at time zero, ﬁrm  cannot optimally choose the price, because 0 =0 ,t h e n0 = −1,a n dt h e r ei s
a distribution of these initial prices which is not necessarily degenerate.
6.2 The eﬃcient ﬂexible price allocation























17and the resource constraints would be


























This condition and the resource constraints (46) are the only implementability conditions. The eﬃcient






−1 =1(taxes are required to counteract the monopoly distortion).




6.3 Implementability with interest rate policy only
We now turn to the sticky price economy. In this section, we restrict the consumption tax and the labor tax
to be constant 
 = , 






−1 =1 . Then the set of equilibria for { ∗























 ( + )(+)
−1 +










where  = ∗
 if  =1 ,a n d = −1,i f =0 ;
 ( )








t h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n t s












and the zero bound constraint  ≥ 0.
There are two reasons why the ﬂexible price allocation might not be implemented: the zero bound on
nominal interest rates and the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. The ﬁrst reason is by now familiar. The
second reason is new. With idiosyncratic shocks, at the eﬃcient allocation, the relative price for any two




 .W i t hs t i c k y
prices, it is impossible to replicate this volatile pattern of relative prices.
186.4 Implementability with both interest rates and tax policy
With ﬂexible tax rates, an equilibrium for { ∗
 































together with (48), where  = ∗

















(50); and ﬁnally the restriction that the zero bound constraint be veriﬁed  ≥ 0.






























Note that the weight 0 depends on the path for the consumption taxes.
When ﬂexible taxes can be used, the zero bound constraint does not restrict the set of implementable
allocations and prices. To see this, consider a sequence for prices and allocations { ∗
    } that
satisﬁes (51), (48), (52), and (50), but does not necessarily satisfy the zero bound constraint. We denote
by {

  } the corresponding sequence of taxes and nominal interest rates, and we denote by 0 the
quantity deﬁned in equation (54) for this allocation.
The same allocation and process for prices can be implemented with another sequence {˜ 
˜ 
 ˜ } for taxes
in such a way that the zero bound constraint is satisﬁed. We now explain how to construct consumption
and labor taxes that implement the original allocation with the new interest rate ˜  =m a x{0}.T h ek e y
is to construct consumption taxes in such a way that (52) holds and ˜ 0 = 0.
In order to perform this construction recursively, it is useful to represent the realization of uncertainty
as a tree. Consider a history (a node in the tree) and assume that ˜ 
 has been chosen. We construct ˜ 
+1








































19This can be seen as a system of two equations in the unknowns ˜ 
+1.T h i ss y s t e ma l w a y sh a sas o l u t i o n








is not constant across the possible continuation histories, or in other words that this date- +1random
variable is not predictable at time . We then set labor taxes as follows










We have proved the following result: modulo a technical condition, every allocation that can be imple-
mented with a combination of taxes and monetary policy that does not necessarily respect the zero lower
bound constraint can also be implemented with a diﬀerent combination of taxes and monetary policy that
does respect the zero lower bound constraint. Our proof can easily be adapted to show the stronger results
that the interest rate is a redundant instrument when ﬂexible taxes can be used. While the nominal interest
rate is a redundant policy instrument when taxes are also used for stabilization, taxes are not redundant
instruments. For example, if taxes are not used, then the set of implementable allocations will be restricted
by the zero bound on nominal interest rates.
It is important to emphasize that even with ﬂexible taxes, the eﬃcient allocation cannot be implemented.
This would require a richer set of instruments, i. e. consumption and labor taxes speciﬁct oe a c hﬁrm in the
economy.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
The main conclusion of this paper is that in the standard New-Keynesian model, the zero bound constraint
on nominal interest rates is not a relevant restriction on policy when both ﬁscal and monetary policy are
ﬂexible. In response to a recent literature on using ineﬃcient monetary or government spending policies to
circumvent the zero bound constraint in the New-Keynesian model, we show that tax policy can do that at
zero cost.
The argument that ﬁscal policy can neutralize the eﬀects of the zero bound is very simple. Suppose the
objective of policy was to lower real rates. If nominal rates cannot be lowered, real rates can still be low
if expected inﬂation is high. Getting all prices to move together in response to aggregate conditions–so
expected inﬂation is high–may come at a cost. Note that the relevant inﬂation to consider is producer price
inﬂation. Indeed, it may be costly to get all producers in the economy to raise all future prices uniformly.
But inﬂation arising from a reduction in current consumption taxes (or increases in future consumption
taxes) is easy to achieve, can be announced and implemented at zero cost, and brings down real interest
rates.
Movements in consumption taxes would in general distort other margins. For this reason we have to
use a model where those decisions are explicitly modelled, and allow for other taxes as well. In a standard
new-Keynesian model, we show that, if consumption and labor income taxes are both used, it is possible
20to compensate for the distortions and achieve the ﬁrst best. We then analyze the same economy but with
capital accumulation. The main results extend to this case, as long as ﬂexible capital income taxes are also
used. Importantly, because our policy implements the eﬃcient allocation, it is time-consistent: if a future
planner were given an opportunity to revise this policy in the future, it would choose not to do so.
We ﬁrst consider an environment where the ﬁrst best can be implemented, even at the zero bound.
This assumption makes the results particularly stark, but the irrelevance of the zero bound constraint
holds more generally. We consider an extension of the model where the full eﬃcient allocation cannot be
achieved, because of idiosyncratic shocks or because the initial distribution of prices of the diﬀerent ﬁrms is
not degenerate. Productive eﬃciency can no longer be achieved, but tax policy can undo the zero bound
restriction on nominal interest rates.
In order for the zero bound to be ineﬀective, taxes must be ﬂexible. But, are taxes ﬂexible enough? After
witnessing the policy response to the recent crisis in the US and elsewhere, it is hard to argue for lack of
ﬂexibility of any ﬁscal policy. There are also many examples of movements in sectorial or state level taxes
with the purpose of stimulating spending. Interesting examples are the tax holidays on sales taxes in many
states in the US,15 and programs such as the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) set up in
June 2009.16
We have analyzed these questions in a model with sticky prices but ﬂexible wages. It should be clear
that our policies can be adapted to an economy with sticky wages, provided that the employer and employee
components of the payroll tax can be adjusted separately.
We have analyzed the implications of a particular restriction on the nominal interest rate, that it cannot
be negative. But for the economy of a small state in a federation or a small economy in a monetary union,
the nominal interest rate is always beyond control. The implications for stabilization policy are similar to
the ones we have seen in this paper, applied to an apparently very diﬀerent issue. If interest rate policy
cannot be adjusted, tax policy can still be, and the constraints on the nominal rate can be made irrelevant.
Common nominal interest rates do not have to be too low or too high.
In the economy we have analyzed, we do not consider good speciﬁc taxes. And concluded that ﬁscal
policy at the zero bound can do as well as monetary policy away from the zero bound. In an environment
where diﬀerent sectors are hit by diﬀerent shocks, or aﬀected diﬀerently by common shocks, ﬁscal policy that
treats diﬀerent sectors diﬀerently can do better than monetary policy, whether at the zero bound or away
from it.
15It is customary for many states in the US to announce yearly sales tax holidays for speciﬁcs e t so fg o o d s .T h e yt y p i c a l l y
last for only a few days.
16Commonly known as Cash for Clunkers, this was a temporary subsidy for the trading in and purchase of a new, more fuel
eﬃcient, vehicle. The initial budget was set to one billion dollars and planned to last for ﬁve months. Due to the high number
of applications, it was terminated after the second month, and the ﬁnal budget was close to three billion.
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238 Appendix: The log-linearized model













The steady state has
 = ,  = ,  =1 
 = 
 = 
 =  = 1+ = 
−1
so that
 =( 1− )()




If we log-linearize equation (15) using (18) to replace labor, we obtain
b  + Γb  − b 

 ' ˆ  − ln














=1if  is multiplicative
b  =l n












ˆ  =l n ( 1 + )
Linearization of the aggregate resource constraint yields














assuming that government consumption is constant, delivers

 + 
b  = b 
So, if we let −1 = 
+,t h e n
b  = b 
If we also assume that the shock  is multiplicative, so Γ =1  we can write equation (57) as
b  +b  − b 

 ' ˆ  − ln
−1 − +1 + b +1 + b +1 − b 

+1
24or, letting  =1 
b  ' b +1 + 
h
ˆ  − +1 −
³
ln

















































































































Ω+ = b 

+ + b 


























= (+ +)+ then  =0  Note also that 0
Thus, we can write








+ + b 

+ + ()+b + − b +
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 + b 
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++1 + b 
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where b  =l n
















= +1 + +1( − 1)
25s ow ec a nw r i t et h ee q u a t i o na s
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++1 + b 
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 + b 
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++1 + b 
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 + b 

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But the log linearization of (17) delivers
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b  = b 
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We assume that the shock  is multiplicative, so  =0 .I fw el e t =
³
ln
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´
 the system
can be written as
 ' b  +  (b 

 + b 

)++1
b  ' b +1 − (ˆ  − +1 − )+(b 

+1 − b 

)
with the constraint that ˆ  ≥ 0.
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